Prior research finds that economic shocks lead to merger waves within an industry. However, industries do not exist in isolation. In this paper, we argue that both intra-and inter-industry merger waves are driven by customer-supplier relations between industries. To test our theory, we construct an industry network using techniques from the social-networking literature, where inter-industry connections are determined by the strength of supplier and customer relations. First, we find that the strength of industry network ties strongly predicts inter-industry merger activity in the cross-section. Second, we show that merger waves propagate across the industry network over time: high levels of merger activity in an industry lead to subsequently high levels of activity in connected industries. By using a network approach, we provide new insight into understanding why mergers occur in waves.
THE IMPORTANCE OF INDUSTRY LINKS IN MERGER WAVES
To empirically test the relationship between merger activity and industry relations, we construct a network of industry trade flows using input-output data from the U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis.
We employ methods first developed in social networking and graph theory research to analyze the relationship between the industry network and the network of inter-industry mergers. The network approach allows us to consider higher order effects of the propagation of industry shocks through the economy. For example, network analysis measures an industry's connection with another industry differently depending upon on how connected is the second industry. The second industry's connections are in turn measured by the connections of its trading partners, and so on.
Using the network approach is important because it provides a much richer analysis than is possible using a supply-chain approach. In fact, this is the first paper to model product market relationships as a network. Though we use this approach to investigate merger waves, we believe this approach will have many important applications in a wide range of future research.
We first report that product market relationships strongly predict merger activity both within and across industries. The simple correlation between an industry's centrality in the industry trade network and the merger network is 35%. Results from both an ordinary-least squares regression and from more advanced exponential random graph models (ERGM) show that the inter-industry mergers are more likely between two industries when they have stronger supplier-customer relationships, controlling for industry valuation, returns, concentration, and macroeconomic shocks. The results from the ERGM model imply that the probability that inter-industry trade relations predict inter-industry mergers is above 95%. This effect is present in every year from 1986 to 2008 and is stronger during market booms and aggregate merger waves. These results imply that economic fundamentals drive merger waves not only within an industry, but also across industries.
Next, we explore the diffusion of merger activity across the industry network. As hypothesized above, we find empirical evidence that unusually high merger activity in one industry is positively correlated with subsequently high merger activity in the industries to which it is connected through the customer-supplier network. Specifically, the occurrence of high merger activity in an industry is at least three times more likely if one of its supplier or customer industries experienced high merger activity in the prior year. The marginal probability of unusually high merger activity in the next year ranges from 75% to 99% if connected industries experience high merger activity in the current
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year. This result is also robust to controls for aggregate market returns, industry market-to-book, dispersion of industry returns, financing liquidity, aggregate merger volume, and the occurrence of deregulatory shocks. This paper extends the literature on merger waves in a new direction. Prior work has investigated the role of economic shocks (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Harford, 2005) versus market mis-valuation (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005) as determinants of merger waves. We do not attempt to disentangle this issue, but rather present new evidence to explain how merger waves propagate across an economy. However, we should point out that our evidence on the importance of economic links in explaining how merger activity spreads between industries is inconsistent with a theory of mergers based on mis-valuation. In particular, purely mis-valuation driven mergers would not be expected to cluster in industry pairings with strong economic ties.
Our paper is more closely related to recent research that investigates the role of industry relations on corporate finance. In addition to Becker and Thomas (2008) and Bhattacharyya and Nain (2008) cited above, Fee and Thomas (2004) and Shahrur (2005) use vertical relationships to test the effects of horizontal mergers on market power. Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) find that suppliers to firms that file for bankruptcy suffer negative and significant wealth effects. Our paper is the first to focus on inter-industry mergers and also the first to use network analysis to study inter-industry effects.
Finally, we note that although it is generally accepted and intuitive that some mergers are motivated by vertical integration, very little about vertical mergers has actually been documented. In fact, Fan and Goyal (2006) report that prior to their paper, even basic facts such as the proportion of mergers that are vertical were unknown. Only recently, Kedia, Ravid, and Pons (2008) investigates wealth effects in vertical mergers, finding that the wealth effects are greater when market-based transactions are more uncertain. In contrast, by explicitly examining vertical relations among industries and expanding the analysis to include indirect relations in an economic network setting, we increase the understanding of the role that vertical product market relationships play in overall merger activity.
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I. Data Sources and Methods
A. Industry Trade Network
Since 1967, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has produced input-output (IO) tables of product market relations for years ending in two and seven for roughly 500 unique industries.
However, the industry definitions of each BEA report differs from prior reports. This means that we must choose one of the BEA reports to use throughout our study, since our unit of observation is an industry-pair. We use the 1997 IO definitions in our study because it evenly splits our merger data (described below) into two equal time periods. The 1997 report is also concurrent with the largest aggregate merger activity in our sample period. If instead, we matched merger data to the most recent IO industry definitions, we would not be able to compare one set of industries to the prior set. The necessity of using just one IO report makes finding significant relationships between IO relations and mergers less likely as more noise is introduced.
The 1997 IO report defines commodity outputs and producing industries. An industry may produce more than one commodity (though the output of an industry is typically dominated by one commodity). The 'Make' table of the IO report records the dollar value of each commodity produced by the producing industry. There are 480 commodities and 491 industries in the Make The thirteen industries or final users in the Use table that are not in the Make table include personal consumption expenditures, private fixed investment, change in private inventories, exports and imports, and federal and state government expenditures. We modify the Make table to include employee compensation as a commodity that is solely produced by the employee compensation industry. This allows employee compensation to be included as an input in production. Without including labor costs, some inputs may appear to be a larger component of total inputs than otherwise.
We wish to create matrices from the Use and Make tables that record flows of inputs and outputs between industries. Following Becker and Thomas (2008) we calculate SHARE, an I × C matrix (Industry x Commodity) that records the percentage of commodity c produced by industry i. The U SE matrix is a C × I matrix that records the dollar value of industry i's purchases of commodity c as an input. The REV SHARE matrix is SHARE × U SE and is the I × I matrix of dollar flows from the customer industry on column j to supplier industry on row i. Finally, the CU ST matrix is REV SHARE in producers' prices divided by the sum of all sales for an industry (in producers' prices). The SU P P matrix is REV SHARE in purchasers prices divided by the sum of all purchases (in purchasers' prices) by industry. The CU ST matrix records the percentage of industry i's sales that are purchased by industry j. The SU P P matrix records the percentage of industry j's input that are purchased from industry i. These two matrices describe the trade flows between all industries in the economy.
Because we will match merger data to the IO industries we follow the correspondence tables between the 1997 IO industries and the 1997 6-digit NAICS codes provided by the BEA. In many cases, each IO industry corresponds to one 6-digit IO industry. In other cases, a single IO industry is comprised of multiple 6-digit NAICS codes. In one case, Construction, the 2-digit NAICS code 23, corresponds to 13 different IO industries. Since we can not distinguish between the IO industries we collapse the 13 IO industries into one industry composed of all NAICS codes in the 2-digit code 23. Thus, accounting for this and including only IO industries that have corresponding NAICS codes (this excludes governments and export/import adjustments) we are left with 471 industries.
THE IMPORTANCE OF INDUSTRY LINKS IN MERGER WAVES
B. Merger Data
Merger data is from SDC Thomson Platinum database. We collect all mergers that meet the following criteria:
• Announcement dates between 1/1/1986 and 12/31/2008
• Both target and acquirer are U.S. firms
• The acquirer buys 20% or more of the target's shares
• The acquirer owns 51% or more of the target's shares after the deal
• Only completed mergers
Since the focus of this study is merger activity, rather than wealth effects, we do not restrict the legal form of organization of the target or acquirer. This produces a sample of 48,359 observations.
By not restricting our sample to public firms, we have a much more complete sample than is typically used in existing merger research. For each observation we record the value of the deal, the date, and the primary NAICS codes of the acquirer and target. Because SDC records NAICS codes using 2007 NAICS definitions we convert all NAICS codes from SDC to 1997 NAICS codes to match to the IO data. Then for each deal we map the 1997 NAICS to the appropriate 1997 IO industry. Due to missing NAICS codes we are left with 45,695 observations. Next, we record merger activity both yearly and cross-sectionally for each directed IO industrypair of acquirer and target industries. This produces 471 2 = 221, 841 unique pairs. Directed industry pairs means that we differentiate between acquirer and target industries. For each time window (yearly and cross-sectionally) we record the number and dollar value of mergers where the acquirer was in industry i and the target was in industry j. This means we have separate observations for deals involving acquirers in industry i that are buying targets in industry j and deals involving acquirers in industry j that are buying targets in industry i. Since in non-horizontal mergers, it is likely that the acquirer could be in either industry, we also record the data in a nondirected way between two industries. This yields Finally, we record the product market relations between industries from the SU P P and CU ST matrices for both directions of relations. This means we record the percentage of total sales bought by the customer industry assuming that the acquirer is the customer and separately that the target is the customer. We do the same for the percentage of supplier inputs purchased by the customer industry, assuming the acquirer is the supplier in one variable, and assuming the target is the acquirer in the second variable.
C. Network Measures
A primary innovation of this paper is to treat the industry input-output matrix as a network. Any network can be described by an N × N adjacency matrix, A, consisting of N unique 'nodes' or 'vertices'. The nodes are connected through 'edges.' Emphasizing the importance of edges in a network, nodes are most generally defined as an endpoint of an edge. In this paper, a node is an industry and an edge is either a product market relationship or a merger relationship. Each entry in the adjacency matrix A, denoted a ij , for row i and column j, records the strength of the connection between nodes i and j. A binary matrix simply records a one if there is a connection and zero if no connection, but different values may also be assigned in a weighted adjacency matrix to indicate the strength of the connection. In addition, A is not restricted to be symmetric so that connections may be directional.
To illustrate these concepts, Figure 1 The complexity of networks is obvious even in such a simple subset of the data. Given a network structure, the CU ST and SU P P matrices defined above can be thought of as adjacency matrices with 471 nodes where connections are weighted by the directional strength of the IO relationships.
Using the same industry nodes, where industry connections are the number and value of mergers between industries, we generate an additional network based on the inter-industry M&A activity.
Increasing the number of nodes to 471 and increasing the number of connections exponentially provides an extremely complex network of industry relations. To analyze these networks we use techniques first developed in graph theory and social networks. We employ two measures of network centrality: degree centrality and eigenvector centrality. The degree centrality of a given node in a network is simply the number of links that come from it, answering the question: how many direct connections does it have? Formally, node i's degree centrality is the sum of its row in the network's adjacency matrix where connections are binary. If connections are weighted values, then the degree is referred to as strength.
The other centrality measure we consider is eigenvector centrality, formally defined by Bonacich (1972) as the principal eigenvector of the network's adjacency matrix. Intuitively, a node will be considered more central if it is connected to other nodes that are themselves central. If we define the eigenvector centrality of node i as c i , then c i is proportional to the sum of the c j 's for all other nodes j = i:
where M (i) is the set of nodes that are connected to node i and λ is a constant. In matrix notation, this is
Thus, c is the principal eigenvector of the adjacency matrix.
There are other measures of centrality and network statistics in general. We choose to focus on degree centrality and eigenvector centrality because they best reflect how shocks would propagate through an economy. Borgatti (2005) shows that these two measures capture a flow process across a network that is not restricted by prior history (such as a viral infection like chicken pox would be, since a node is immune after receiving the virus) and allows for a shock to spread in two different directions at the same time (as opposed to a package that moves along a network which can only be in one place at one time). Therefore, these measures of centrality allow an economic shock that flows to the same industry from two different sources to have a larger impact than a single shock, and allows the shock to spread in parallel to multiple industries simultaneously. Looking across all possible inter-industry pairings for any given industry, the mean number of cross-industry mergers for an industry is 53.7 and the median is 13. This compares with an average
II. Empirical Tests of Mergers and Industry-Relations
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of 43.4 and median of 4 for intra-industry mergers. Twenty percent of industries had no intraindustry mergers during the sample period, compared with 2.6% for inter-industry mergers. These summary statistics indicate that mergers cluster by industry and also by industry-pairs. Second, using a more refined measure of industry classifications than Fama-French 49 or two-digit SIC codes reveals that inter-industry mergers are slightly more common than intra-industry mergers, in contrast to most reports.
A.2. Industry Input-Output Relationships
Table II presents summary statistics of the input-output relationships. We divide the sample into inter-industry pairs, intra-industry pairs, and inter-industry pairs that have substantial trade relations. To identify industry pairs with a substantial relationship, we follow Fan and Goyal (2006) and require either (1) that a customer industry buys at least 1% of a supplier industry's total output (Customer %), or (2) that a supplying industry supplies at least 1% of the total inputs of a customer industry (Supplier %). This is necessary since most industry-pairs have almost zero trade relationships. Across all 110,685 inter-industry pairs the mean percentage of sales purchased by a customer is only 0.22%. Likewise, the percentage of inputs that one industry supplies to another in an average industry-pair is only 0.26%. More than 95% of industry-pairs have customer and supplier relationships less than 1%. This matches the merger sample, where 95% of industry-pairs had no inter-industry mergers.
In the inter-industry pairs with substantial trade flows, the average percentage of total sales purchased is 5% and the median is 2.2%. The average percentage of total inputs supplied is 3.9% and the median is 2.1%. Intra-industry pairs also exhibit trade flows. In this case the industry uses a portion of its output as an input. For example, a firm that produces energy must also use energy in its production process. The median supply and customer relationships are 1.1% and 1.5% and close to 50% of industries have supplier and customer relationships less than 1%.
To visually compare merger activity to product market relationships, Figure 
A.3. Network Measures
The above results indicate that mergers and product-market relationships are concentrated in specific industry-pairs. The visual evidence in Figure 3 also emphasizes that industries are connected through a network of trade. In this section, we investigate these networks in more detail.
In Table III, 
B. Tests of the Relationship Between Merger and IO Networks
We now conduct formal analyses of our hypothesis. The first is a traditional correlation analysis, testing whether industries with high IO centrality also have high inter-industry merger centrality.
We use both measures of centrality: degree centrality (the number of other industries to which each industry is connected) and eigenvector centrality (the sum of weighted connections to a given industry, weighted by how connected the other industry itself is).
Table IV presents the correlation matrix for the centrality measures. Within each network, the two centrality measures are highly correlated, more so in the merger network. More importantly, the centrality measures are correlated across networks, so that central industries in the IO network are likely to be central industries in the merger network. For industry eigenvector centrality, the correlation between the IO and merger networks is a significant 35.15%. For degree centrality, the correlation is 26.32%, also highly significant.
The second analysis of the relation between the IO network and the merger network uses a network analysis technique called Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGM). Essentially, ERGM treats the entire network as an outcome to be explained or predicted, much as we might typically treat an announcement return as a dependent variable to be explained. Somewhat more specifically, ERGM tries "to describe parsimoniously the local selection forces that shape the global structure of a network." 1 1 An excellent overview of ERGM is provided in Hunter, Handcock, Butts, Goodreau, and Morris (2008, p. 2) . For more technical references see the papers cited in Robins and Morris (2007) .
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To make the fundamental idea of ERGM more concrete, given a set of N nodes, if we let G denote a random graph on these nodes (i.e., a random set of connections), and let g denote a particular graph on the N nodes, then,
where θ ≡ An unknown vector of parameters (4) s(g) ≡ A known vector of network statistics on g
Similarly to a maximum-likelihood estimator, we wish to estimate θ, the unknown parameters of the model, which are the coefficients on the s(g). However, finding all possible random graphs is computationally challenging. As a feasible alternative, Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulations of the random graphs are performed.
In our context, the local forces we focus on are edge covariance. While we previously conceptualized the IO network and merger network as two separate networks to be compared, they can just as easily be thought of as a single network of industries with two different types of edges -one type describing IO connections between industries and another type describing merger connections between the same set of industries. As the edge covariance's name suggests, it formally analyzes the degree to which the two different types of edges in the network covary. Specifically, controlling for the number of possible edges in the network, it assesses the ability of IO edges to predict merger edges. This measure considers the network as a whole and we will perform the analysis on both the annual merger networks as well as the overall merger network formed by taking all mergers over our sample period. Additionally, this technique can take into account the strength of the connection, so it is assessing more than just whether an economic IO connection predicts a merger connection. Rather, we can ask whether strong economic connections predict high rather than low merger activity.
We present the results of the ERGM analysis in Table V It is clear from the results in Table V that the IO network explains the merger network. In the cross-sectional ERGM analysis, each of the four ways of measuring the industry trade network has a positive and significant coefficient. Further, as there are four different ways of assessing the economic connection, we test each. We have no a priori reason to believe that one measure of the economic connection between two industries is inherently more important for predicting merger activity than another. Since a log-odds ratio above six implies a probability of 99%, all of the IO networks are highly predictive of the M&A network. When we include all four together, we find that they all significantly predict the merger network, each incrementally contributing to an understanding of the occurrence and intensity of merger activity between industries. This is reflected in the lower Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) score in the fifth regression. The AIC measure indicates the goodness-of-fit between the models, but the level of an AIC score is uninformative by itself.
In column 6 of Table V we add industry characteristics that have been shown to affect mergers as additional explanatory variables. The industry economic shock index is calculated similarly to Harford (2005) . For each industry, we find the first principal component of the medians of the absolute value of changes in cash flow, asset turnover, R&D, capital expenditures, employee growth, return on assets, and sales growth for each firm in the industry. We rank this principal component across industries and time and choose industry-years in the top quartile as "shock"
years. This variable measures shocks to economic fundamentals at the industry level. We also add the median market-to-book, mean returns, and standard deviation of returns for all firms in each industry, using data from Compustat and CRSP. Lastly, we include the eight-firm concentration ratio as provided by the most recent Economic Census of the United States. Since these tests are cross-sectional, we take the average of the time series of each of these variables as our control variables.
After including these control variables we find that the industry connections are still positively and significantly related to merger activity. In fact all of the coefficient estimates of the IO connections increase after adding the controls. This result is particularly strong since the data limitations of the control variables reduces the size of the network in the analysis, and hence the strength of the industry connection variables. Though these tests account for an average effect of the control variables, the interpretation of their effect on merger activity is unclear since they are likely to change over time. Therefore, we separately estimate ERGMs for each year in the sample period. Figure 4 presents the t−statistics from each of the four explanatory IO networks in ERGM tests which are run using yearly M&A network data. The edge covariance coefficients are highly significant in each year, as they were in the overall sample. We note that the importance of industry connections is not smaller during aggregate merger waves or periods of high stock market valuation.
That is, economic connections between industries are more important in explaining merger activity during waves than at other times. This is consistent with the hypothesis that shocks propagating through the IO network generate aggregate merger waves. In unreported results, the t−statistics of the industry-level control variables vary considerably over time, in contrast to the much more stable t−statistics of the IO network variables.
Although ERGM analysis is the best way to analyze our question, it is new to the literature. As a check, we repeat our analysis with OLS regressions. Regressing the value and count of mergers between industries on the four measures of their IO connectedness produces the same inferences -IO connections are highly significant in explaining merger activity.
Our overall conclusion from the analysis in this section is that the IO network is quite important in explaining merger activity, as represented in the merger network. Consequently, in order to better understand why mergers occur and why they cluster in time, one needs to consider the merger activity in the context of the economic IO network and the activity in connected industries.
In the next section, we ask exactly that question: whether we can dynamically explain merger activity in a given industry with merger activity in connected industries.
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C. Diffusion of Merger Activity Across the Industry Network
Prior work has made some progress toward understanding periods of heightened merger activity within industries and in the economy as a whole -so called merger waves. Gort (1969), Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) , and Harford (2005) all point to economic disturbances that motivate asset reshuffling within and across industries. Some recent work has focused on specific industry connections such as Fee and Thomas (2004) , Shahrur (2005) , and Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008), who focus on vertical relations.
To date, however, no one to our knowledge has considered a model of merger activity within an industry based on heightened merger activity in all connected industries. In this section we test such a model using the merger activity in connected industries, weighted by the distance between industries in the network, to predict merger activity within the primary industry. First, to illustrate how diffusion of merger activity across related industries occurs, we present an example from the timber-related industries we discussed above.
C.1. Diffusion of Mergers Across the Forest Industry
The forest industry is an ideal setting to illustrate merger diffusion because it experienced a large external shock which led to a subsequent reorganization of various industries. In 1990, the Northern Spotted Owl was listed as "threatened" under the Endangered Species Act. Further injunctions in 1991 and the enactment of the Northwest Forest Plan in 1994 led to the protection of 24.4 million acres of federal land in Washington, Oregon, and California, the historic home of the timber industry (Ferris, 2009) . At the time, much of the timber supply came from logging on federal land. Smaller sawmills and logging companies that relied on the federal lands were squeezed out by larger suppliers that owned private nurseries. In addition, the industry moved away from the Northwest and towards the South were timber tracts were privately owned. However, the protection of the old-growth timber led to a severe and permanent supply shock.
Panel ( The timber supply and price shock led to a large-scale consolidation in timber-related industries.
Recall from Figure Figure 2 , since that wave peaked in 1997-1998. Thus the aggregate merger wave is a collection of industry merger waves that begin and die within the overall aggregate wave. Also notice that the pulp mills industry was the last to experience a merger wave. This is consistent with our hypothesis since it is less related to the timber industry than the other three industries.
Panel ( had an affect on forest nurseries and pulp mills, which also responded to the new environment through an industry merger wave. Though these results are consistent with our hypothesis, we still need to show that the results generalize to other industries. We pursue this goal in the next section.
C.2. Formal Tests of Merger Diffusion Across the Industry Network
In this section, we present the results from rigorous tests of the diffusion of merger activity across the industry network. In order to do so, we create a measure of weighted merger activity, where the weights are proportional to the strength of the economic connection to the industry with the merger activity. Intuitively, what this measure captures is the value of merger activity in industries connected to i, not counting merger activity involving i itself, weighted by the strength of the connection. Specifically, for each industry in each year we calculate the total value of deals involving a member of industry j. This includes both intra-industry (horizontal) and inter-industry mergers. Next, we subtract from that total the value of any deals involving industry i. Finally, we multiply the resulting value by one of the measures of IO connection between industry i and industry j and sum this product for all industries j = i. In mathematical notation, this is:
where a ij is the row i, column j entry from the IO network adjacency matrix and v kjt is the row k, column j entry from the directed and valued merger network in year t, where acquirers are on rows and targets on columns and the values are the 2008 dollar values of merger activity.
This measure is central to our question of how merger activity propagates through the economy.
One industry may be subject to a specific technological, regulatory or economic shock and respond by reshuffling assets through mergers and acquisitions. That very reshuffling may itself be considered a shock to connected industries, causing them to reorganize assets as well. An example of this is the record industry's reorganization following the merger wave in the media distribution industry discussed in the introduction.
To test the relationship, we estimate models intended to predict merger activity in industry i in year t + 1 using a host of industry and macroeconomic characteristics in year t, as well as our measure of weighted connected merger activity in year t. Specifically, we estimate the following logit model:
+ γNetwork Measures t
where High M&A i,t+1 equals 1 if the aggregate value of mergers in industry i in year t + 1 is in the highest quartile of aggregate merger value across all years for industry i. In addition to the measure of weighted connected merger activity, we include the industry's centrality as well as its centrality multiplied by the scaled total value of merger activity in year t. We also include the annual return on the S&P 500, an indicator variable for deregulatory events affecting the industry from Viscusi, Harrington, and Vernon (2005) , the spread between commercial and industrial loans and the federal funds rate (the C&I rate spread), industry-level median market-to-book ratio, mean and standard deviation of returns, industry concentration, and the economic shock index decsribed previously. Table VI summarizes the key data used in the estimations.
The first four columns of Table VII present odds ratios from a logit predicting high merger activity in an industry in year t + 1 based on whether it had high activity in year t and our measures of connected merger activity in year t. The odds ratios are normalized by subtracting by one, so that a positive coefficient indicates an increase in the odds ratio, and a negative number indicates a decrease. We use each of the four IO networks weighting schemes in the Connected M&A variables.
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The four specifications consistently show that the level of merger activity in connected industries increases the likelihood that an industry's own merger activity in the subsequent year will also be unusually high. The odds ratios show that the effects are larger when the connected industries rely on the subject industry either as a key customer (Subject Buys from Connected) or as a key supplier (Subject Sells to Connected).
In the last four columns, we add the rest of the explanatory variables. Again, the columns differ only by the IO measure used to weight connected industry merger activity, though we lose a substantial portion of the data due to Compustat and CRSP limitations. The connected industry merger activity remains significant, as does the relatively greater importance of the two weighting schemes based on the acquirer's sales and purchases. The coefficients on the annual return on the S&P 500, the industry mean return and market-to-book ratio are positive, consistent with prior findings that rising stock markets are correlated with merger activity. Consistent with Harford (2005) and Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008), tighter capital, as indicated by a higher commercial and industrial rate spread, reduces overall merger activity. Surprisingly, the standard deviation of industry returns is negatively related to subsequent merger activity. In unreported results, we include only the macro-economic variables in the regressions in order to maintain the same sample size as in the parsimonious specifications in columns one through four and find the estimates to be qualitatively unchanged.
In further robustness tests, we calculate a measure of connected M&A activity by weighting connected M&A activity by the network distance between the subject industry and every other industry. This approach takes the entire network into consideration. Though the strength of the connected M&A variables are weaker they are still significant and positively related to high merger activity in the subject industry. These results show that controlling for variables that may proxy for growth opportunities, misvaluation, and financing liquidity, the network variables remain positively and significantly related to subsequent merger activity.
The results in Table VII highlight the importance of industry shocks in explaining merger activity.
They show that the effect of a shock to a particular industry can travel through the economic network created by input-output relations among industries. In fact, heightened merger activity in connected industries can, by itself, be viewed as a shock to an industry, inducing its own merger activity in response. Viewing merger activity through the lens of industries with interconnections of varying strengths, it is not surprising that more central (more interconnected) industries are less likely to experience peak merger activity outside of an aggregate merger wave. Their very centrality means that intense merger activity in any of the most central industries would be likely to set-off increased merger activity in many other industries, contributing to an aggregate wave.
III. Conclusion
This paper models industries as nodes in a network which are interconnected on multiple dimensions, including industry trade flows and inter-industry merger activity. We hypothesize that economic shocks that affect one industry will also affect the industries that are connected through the network. A shock may lead to mergers in an industry as it adjusts to the new economic environment. We expect to see increased merger activity in the connected industries in direct response to the underlying economic shock which passes through the trade network, or in response to the merger activity in the first industry.
We find strong empirical evidence for our hypothesis. Using input-output data from the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis and a very large sample of mergers from SDC over 1986 to 2008, we first show that the network of inter-industry mergers is highly related to the industry trade network. We find this result using the correlation of centrality measures of the two networks, in simple OLS regressions, and in more sophisticated exponential random graph models that account for the complexity of the networks.
We next show that merger waves flow across the industry-trade network. Abnormally high merger activity in one industry leads to subsequently high merger activity in those industries with the strongest connections through the trade network. This result is robust to macroeconomic factors, such as the market return, aggregate merger activity, the cost of debt financing, and regulatory shocks.
The primary innovation of this paper is to model merger waves in a network setting where networks are defined by actual trade flows across industries. Using the well-developed techniques from network and graph theory, we are able to analyze a much more complex dynamic process of merger waves than has been done in prior research. More generally, this is the first paper to For each industry-year, we calculate the percentile of the number of mergers involving firms in each industry over the period 1986 to 2008. We then take the two-year moving-average of the percentile time-series. Panel (c) presents the same data, but using the one-year leading data for Forest nurseries, and the three-year leading data for Logging and Pulp Mill mergers. Merger data is from SDC. . Connected M&A: Connected Buys from Subject is a measure of merger activity over all industries except industry i, weighted by the IO network connection (Connected Buys from Subject, etc.) between industry i and all other industries. Subject refers to the observation industry, connected to the other industries. IO Degree Centrality (Centrality) is an industry's number of inter-industry connections. IO degree centrality is measured using the binary connections in the Input-Output Network using data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis for 1997. A binary connection is defined as a connection where one industry either supplies at least 1% of the connected industry's inputs, or buys at least 1% of the connected industry's output. Deregulatory Shock equals one if there was a change in regulation in the industry-year. C&I Rate Spread is the difference between commercial and industrial loans and the federal funds rate. The S&P 500 Return is an annual return. p−values are reported in parantheses. Statistical significance is indicated by * * * , * * , and * , for the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels.
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